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ABSTRACT
 
Paul Grice's conversational implicature is a widely
 
studied and commonly accepted theory in the field of
 
linguistics, and Stephen Toulmin's model of argument is
 
perhaps even more wi4ely studied and accepted in the field of
 
argument (Chapter 1). I was struck by the great similarities
 
between the two theories, particularly the leap of logic both
 
are dependent upon, and surprised by the fact that it didn't
 
seem that anyone had esjplored the similarities. In this
 
thesis, I explore the similarities of the processes, of
 
Grice's implicature and Toulmin's model of argximent, and how
 
looking at the two together increases the understanding of
 
both (Chapter 2). Ultimately, what I discovered was that
 
both Grice's implicature and Toulmin's model of argviment are
 
surface manifestations of a larger underling concept of
 
mental models. In addition, the realization that mental
 
models underlie these two processes, which are commonly used
 
every day by human beings, iriustrates how incredibly
 
dependent human beings are on mental models to interpret
 
lapguage and context, as well as make decisions (Chapter 3).
 
Finally, I looked at how these findings show how
 
miscommunicationocdurs and the possible social,
 
intercultural, and educational ramifications of seeing
 
Grice's implicature, Tpulmin's model Of argument, and mental
 
models in light of this new perspective (Chapter 4).
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Introduction
 
One of the pervasive illusions which persists in
 
the analysis of language is that we understand the
 
meaning of a linguistic message solely on the basis
 
of the words and the structure of the sentence(s)
 
used to convey that message.
 
Discourse Analvsis by Gillian Brown and George
 
Yule (223)
 
Paul Grice's idea of conversational implicature explains
 
how people communicate when what is "implied/ suggested,
 
meant ...is distinct from what...[is]...said" (24). An
 
example of implicature occurs when the question "Is Mike
 
home?" is answered "His car is parked in the driveway," from
 
which the hearer is supposed to infer that if Mike's car is
 
in Mike's driveway, then Mike must be home.
 
Toulmin seems to be looking at something somewhat
 
similar to what Grice is as Toulmin dissects arguntents,
 
labels the basic elements common to arguments, forms his
 
Model of Argument, and explains how arguments work according
 
to his model. Toulmin (along with his co-authors Richard
 
Rieke and Allen Janik) says that a "warrant," one of his
 
"elements of eirgument," which he says may be left unstated in
 
arguments, acts as a "license to argue from grounds to a
 
conclusion." In other words, warrants show that the step
 
from the grounds to the claim of an argument "is a
 
rationally defensible one" (Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik,
 
Introduction 45). A warrant allows a person to argue that
 
"wherever there's smoke, there's a fire"; Toulmin says, "We
 
can in fact read it as meaning, 'Wherever smoke is visible,
 
it can be concluded that there is a fire also"' (Toulmin,
 
Rieke, and Janik, Introduction 44).
 
Paul Grice is best known for his contribution to the
 
field of linguistics and Stephen Toulmin is known for his
 
contribution to the field of modern argiament; however, I will
 
argue in this thesis that there is an undeniable, and
 
seemingly unexplored, similarity between their work. I
 
believe Paul Grice's theory of conversational implicature and
 
Stephen Toulmin's model of argiament each take into account a
 
wealth of unstated assumptions which speakers, writers,
 
audiences, and readers carry in their minds and employ in
 
order to interpret language. I further believe that Grice's
 
and Toulmin's practical looks at the process of interpersonal
 
communication give us an insightful view into how language,
 
only a single part of the communication of meaning, works
 
along with the wide variety of shifting physical and societal
 
variables of context.
 
Grice's and Toulmin's ideas hinge on explaining how
 
people are able to "travel" or "leap" from premise to
 
conclusion. Both consciously recognize that there is a leap,
 
both see the leap as being of the same nature, and both offer
 
similar explanations as to how the gaps are filled in so that
 
the leap can be completed. Grice and Toulmin each bring up
 
the extreme importance of background knowledge and context to
 
fill in the gap that occurs between the premise and
 
conclusion. Most importantly, the ideas of both seem to
 
overlap and confirm each other. Grice talks about the
 
importance of argument:
 
The presence of conversational implicature must be
 
capable of being worked out; for even if it can be
 
intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is
 
replaceable by argument, the implicature (if
 
present at all) will not count as a conversational
 
implicature*.. (Grice 31)
 
Meanwhile, Toulmin talks about the validity of inference:
 
Inferring, in a phrase, does not always involve
 
calculating, and the canons of sound argument can
 
be applied alike whether we have reached Our
 
conclusions by way of a computation or by a simple
 
leap. For logic is concerned not with the manner
 
of bur inferring. Or with questions of technique:
 
its primary business is. .retrospective...
 
(Toulmin, Uses 6)
 
This similarity is not all that surprising since both
 
Grice and Toulmin are philosophers reacting against formal
 
logic and making a map of the practical logic people en^loy
 
every day as a part of daily living.
 
In the first chapter of my thesis I will take an in-

depth look at Grice's implicature and Toulmin's warrants. In
 
the second chapter, I will examine the similarities between
 
the two ideas. In the third chapter, I will place these
 
ideas and their implications into a continuing discussion of
 
how the processes of communication work and how
 
miscommunication may arise during these processes. In the
 
fourth chapter, I will explicate my conclusions. Throughout
 
my thesis, I propose to use excerpts from the syndicated
 
newspaper advice column, "Miss Manners," as illustrative
 
texts in order to demonstrate my points. By writing my
 
thesis as I have outlined in this introduction, I hope to add
 
to the understanding of how people communicate with one
 
another and in so doing, to understand where and how
 
possibilities of miscommunication can arise.
 
Chapter One: What Grice and Toulmin Say
 
Part A: What Griee Says
 
At the simplest level, Paul Grice says that people quite
 
often do not say literally whai they meah/ but they are still
 
able to communicate because bthers;can use their own
 
knowledge to fill in the gaps and understand the dlmplied
 
messages. Grice explains that communication is a cooperative
 
effort between speakers and listeners, and his theory of
 
conversational implicature (which may be applied quite
 
successfully to written texts, as well as, conversation)
 
gives a more detailed account of how he believes the
 
cooperative process works.
 
In the essay, "Logic and Conversation," in which Grice
 
introduces his idea of implicature, he starts out by
 
explaining how he means to use the opposing terms
 
"implicature" and "say." Grice defines implicature as a
 
situation in which, "what is implied, suggested, meant...is
 
distinct from what...[is]...said...." (24). In other words,
 
the message the speaker/reader is trying to convey is not
 
conveyed solely by the literal meanings of the words, so an
 
implicature is euti occasion when a message is being implied
 
rather than implicitly stated. On the other hand, the word
 
"say" is related to the literal meanings of the words. Grice
 
states that, "In the sense in which I am using the word say I
 
intend what someone has said to be closely related to the
 
conventional meaning of the words (the sentence) he has
 
uttered" (24-25).
 
Essential to Grice's notion of implicature is his
 
explanation of how conversation is a cooperative effort that
 
is the basis of his Cooperative Principle. Grice points out
 
the cooperative nature of conversation:
 
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a
 
succession of disconnected remarks, and would not
 
be rational if they did. They are
 
characteristically, to some degree at least,
 
cooperative efforts; and each participant
 
recognizes in them, to some extent, a common
 
purpose, or set of purposes, or at least a mutually
 
accepted direction.... it may evolve during the
 
exchange...But at each stage, some possible
 
conversational moves would be excluded as
 
conversationally unsuitable. (26)
 
His ideas seem not only rational, but also obvious to
 
anyone who has earnestly tried to hold a conversation on one
 
subject with another person who is intent on persistency
 
discussing another subject, since, usually, in such instances
 
of a lack of cooperation, a stalemate results, and neither
 
subject is discussed.
 
Grice's Cooperative Principle explains more exactly the
 
nature of the cooperation required of participants in a
 
discussion. The Cooperative Principle tells participants,
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"Make your conversational contribution such as it is
 
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted
 
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are
 
engaged" (Grice 26). Grice also suggests that for anyone who
 
converses with a purpose or goal, such as "giving and
 
receiving information, influencing and being influenced by
 
others," talk exchanges will most likely only meet that
 
purpose or goal if the Cooperative Principle is followed
 
(Grice 30).
 
Grice also breaks the Cooperative Principle into four
 
subcategories of cooperation necessary to effective
 
coiranunication, which he calls "maxims." The four maxims he
 
calls quantity, quality, relation, and manner. The maxim of
 
quantity relates to a speaker giving enough information to
 
forward the purpose of the communication without relating
 
more information than is necessary. The maxim of quality
 
relates to not passing along information that the speaker
 
believes is false or information for which the speaker lacks
 
evidence. The maxim of relation simply commands speakers to
 
"Be relevant," rather than interjecting information that has
 
nothing to do with the current topic and purpose to the
 
conversation (Grice 30). The forth maxim, manner, is
 
slightly different from the preceding three in that it does
 
not relate to what is being said, but rather, to "how what is
 
said is to be said," (Grice 30). The maxim of manner relates
 
to the speakers presenting their inforination in a clear,
 
unambiguous, orderly, and easy to understand manner.
 
According to Grice, these four maxims are important
 
because if a speaker fails to fulfill one or more of the four
 
maxims, then an instance of implicature may be created.
 
Someone might not fulfill a maxim in several ways. A speaker
 
may violate a maxim quietly, which may result in listeners
 
being mislead, or a speaker can make it plain that he or she
 
refuses to cooperate and fulfill one of the maxims, which may
 
result in listeners not getting the information they desire
 
A person may be faced with a clash between two maxims, such
 
as when trying to give as much information as is required
 
(maxim of quantity) while still trying to have adequate
 
evidence for what is being Said (maxim of quality), and end
 
up violating onei or the other maxim. Lastly, a speaker may
 
blatantly fail to fulfill, or "flout," a maxim under the
 
assumption that listeners already possess the information
 
needed to fulfill that maxim. It is in this last case that
 
an instance of implicature is created.
 
If a speaker or writer has flouted a maxim of the
 
Cooperative Principle (and is not unable to fulfill the
 
maxim, trying to mislead, or simply opt out of the
 
conversation), he or she may do so because that person
 
believes that listeners or readers have the information to
 
make up for what is lost by flouting the maxim. In such a
 
case the "speaker or writer is implying part of the messhge,
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but still being cooperative, though, perhaps, making
 
understanding the message a bit more work for the listeners
 
or readers.
 
So, how do listeners and readers come to understand what
 
is being implied? First, according to Grice, unless there is
 
some indication otherwise, most listeners tend to start out
 
by assuming that the Cooperative Principle is being observed.
 
Then, they consider the information they have been given and
 
their own background knowledge, and they logically try to
 
piece together and understand the message being implied.
 
Grice says:
 
The presence of a conversational implicature must
 
be capable of being worked out; for even if it can
 
in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the
 
intuition is replaceable by an argument, the
 
implicature (if present at all) will not count as a
 
conversational implicature.... To work out that a
 
particular conversational implicature is present,
 
the hearer will rely on the following data: (1)
 
the conventional meaning of the words used,
 
together with the identity of any references that
 
may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and
 
its maxims; (3) the context, linguistic or
 
otherwise, of the utterance; other items of
 
background knowledge; and (5) the fact (or supposed
 
fact) that all relevant items falling under the
 
previous headings are available to both
 
participants and both participants know or assume
 
this to be the case. (31)
 
If we return to the very first example of implicature
 
given in the introduction of this thesis, we can see how the
 
gaps are filled in and how an instance of conversational
 
implicature can be "worked out." If the question, "Is Mike
 
home?" is answered, "His car is parked in the drive way,"
 
then the hearer is supposed to infer that, if Mike's car is
 
in Mike's driveway, then Mike must be home. By default, the
 
inquirer is probably going to expect the responder to observe
 
the Cooperative Principle and its maxims (unless there is
 
evidence to the contrary) and the words themselves and the
 
sentence itself are easy enough to comprehend. If the
 
inquirer expects a truthful answer he or she would be asking
 
this question of someone who was in a position to have the
 
information to answer the question. In this case, the
 
speaker would probably ask the question of someone who could
 
see or had just seen Mike's house. The inquirer and the
 
responder are also relying on the shared background knowledge
 
that Mike lives in a suburban area of Southern California so
 
that to run any errands or go anywhere he needs to drive his
 
car, as well as the fact that Mike is not someone who walks
 
or bicycles for exercise, so if Mike's car is in his
 
driveway, it is logical to assimie that Mike is home.
 
10
 
 Obviously, implicature is quite prevalent in everyday
 
speech and writing, and Georgia Green's article, "Some
 
Remarks on Why There is Implicature," sheds some light on
 
reasons why implicature is "so pervasive in natural discourse
 
of all genres, registers, and styles" (77). Green explains
 
that "implicature is in fact quicker (because it leaves out a
 
lot of what is intended to be understood), [socially] safer
 
(because what is intended is not said), and more effective
 
than 'just saying exactly what you mean' (because it depends
 
on the hearer to work out exactly what is intended)," so the
 
hearer has more invested and is more likely to think about
 
and remember the message (78). She also states that
 
implicature "promotes solidarity, implying 'we share so
 
much....'" (Green 86).
 
Green also brings up the idea that "so-called literal,
 
explicit speech is considerably less literal and more
 
figurative than unreflecting judgn^nt would estimate" (84).
 
She estimates that up to 20% of the "content words" in a
 
narrative are used in "extended, metaphorical, or metonymic"
 
ways which would not be listed in dictionaries. As an
 
example, she uses the sentence, "This newspaper claims that
 
the president bombed the hamlet because North Vietnam would
 
not come to terms" (Green 84). For this example she points
 
out that:
 
Newspaper refers to a reporter or an editorial
 
staff, not a paper and ink product; bombed refers
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to an authorization to bomb, not the actual loosing
 
of explosive material; and North Vietnam does not
 
refer to a geographic or political entity, but to
 
the authorized representative of one. (Green 84)
 
Metaphor, meiosis, hyperbole, allusions, sarcasm, and
 
irony are all used in everyday speech to communicate ideas
 
and make a point, and they are often used as part of, or in
 
conjunction with, implicature. This means that not all
 
examples of implicature are as simple and easy to work out as
 
the preceding example involving Mike and his car. The
 
following example of implicature is an example of the
 
complexity of implicature, which may be met with and
 
deciphered in everyday situations. This following selection
 
is a question addressed to Judith Martin, a syndicated
 
newspaper colvminist, who answers letters for her alter ego,
 
known as Miss Manners.
 
Dear Miss Manners;
 
Most wedding cakes are so vulgar, with all the
 
overly fancy trimming, and I would prefer to have a
 
perfectly plain cake. My fiancee', who generally
 
has very good taste, and who agrees with me about
 
keeping the rest of the wedding simple, says that
 
would look "cheap" and wants one of those several-

tiered monstrosities. She has forgotten that she
 
once told me a story about being a flower girl and
 
looking up at her cousin's cake which had a bride
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 and groom on the top, and probably that's what she
 
really wants but is ashamed to admit it. This is
 
such a dumb argument, but it makes me wonder what
 
else she is keeping from me in the way Of secret
 
ickyness.
 
Gentle Reader:
 
Who are you, the Mies van der Rohe of the
 
pastry shop? Wedding cakes are supposed to be
 
vulgar. Go buy yourself a doughnut to satisfy your
 
aesthetic sense, and let her have that wedding
 
cake. (Martin 352)
 
The question addressed to Miss Manners, in a rather
 
roundabout and implied way by a groom-to-be, is whether it is
 
better to have a "vulgar!' or a "perfedtly plain" wedding
 
cake. Miss Manners Starts her answer to the groom, who
 
prefers the plain cake, with a question: "Who are you, the
 
Mies van der Rohe of the pastry shop?" The Maxim of Relation
 
seems to be violated. Readers may find themselves asking how
 
a "German-born U.S. architect whose rectilinear forms,
 
crafted in elegant simplicity, epitomized the International
 
Style of architecture that emerged in the late 1920" ("Mies
 
van der Rohe" 116), is relevant to a discussion of wedding
 
cakes? There is also the possibility that readers will be
 
asking who Mies van der Rohe is. Miss Manners does seem to
 
realize that these questions could arise because she
 
continues her explanation, and the rest of Miss Manners'
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answer is more clearly related to the issue at hand. Though
 
the Maxim of Relation seems to be violated by Miss Manners'
 
opening question. Miss Manners seems to compensate by adding
 
material until the question is obviously, if not implicitly,
 
answered. The sentence "Wedding cakes are supposed to be
 
vulgar" does not directly answer the groom's question, but it
 
does seem to imply that vulgar wedding cakes are all right.
 
The last sentence, "Go buy yourself a doughnut to satisfy
 
your aesthetic sense, and let her have that wedding cake,"
 
ties the pastry-architecture analogy together. This last
 
sentence seems to plainly imply that a vulgar wedding cake is
 
preferable to a plain one. This sentence also may hint that
 
the aesthetic sense of the groom is best displayed at a
 
different time and place than when choosing the wedding cake.
 
Miss Manners does gain something by using the reference
 
to Mies van der Rohe. Miss Manners links the groom who has
 
written to her with Mies van der Rohe when she asks the
 
question "Who are you, the Mies van der Rohe of the pastry
 
shop?" By asking this question, she implies that the groom's
 
taste is in some way similar to that of Mies van der Rohe.
 
It is the hyperbolic nature of the comparison between the two
 
men that brings the hvimor to Miss Mcinners' answer. Here is a
 
groom who is concerned that his wedding cake is not tacky,
 
and he is being compared to a famous architect who, to a
 
great extent, has influenced the form of modern architecture.
 
The similarities between the two are greatly outweighed by
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their differences. The groom would have to be suffering some
 
serious delusions of grandeur to truly believe he was a Mies
 
van der Rohe.
 
There is also the implication that the groom, by
 
insisting on a plain cake for aesthetic reasons, is
 
overstepping his bounds because the groom does not have the
 
credibility, in matters of aesthetics, of a famous architect.
 
By asking "Who are you?" Miss Manners seems to be using a
 
slightly more polite version of the sarcastic question, "Who
 
do you think you are?" a question which seems inherently to
 
imply an overstepping of bounds by the person being
 
questioned.
 
For those readers who really know the trends in 20th
 
century architecture, the link of similar tastes between the
 
groom and Mies van der Rohe holds still more meaning. The
 
architectural ideas of Mies van der Rohe, father of the now
 
common "steel bones and glass skins" skyscrapers, fell out of
 
favor, and he had to face "the charge that his
 
buildings...[were]...cold" ("Mies van der Rohe" 117). It
 
also seems likely that the readers will see the groom as
 
"cold" because he prefers a coldly aesthetic, plain cake to
 
the more romantic cake his fiancee prefers, and also because
 
he is willing to make an issue of what he himself calls "such
 
a diamb argument" by writing to Miss Manners. Some readers
 
may even go as far as to suggest that the groom is putting
 
aesthetics before his bride's happiness.
 
15
 
Miss Manners seems to violate the maxim of relation in
 
order to communicate by implicature for many reasons
 
including that she can communicate more by implying than by
 
using literal language. The preceding example shows that she
 
can say much more by using implicature. As Green points out,
 
in instances of implicature such as this, paraphrasing can
 
not adequately say the same thing. Instead of merely
 
answering the question addressed to her, she comments on, and
 
gets her readers thinking about, underlying issues, such as
 
aesthetics and tradition, as well.
 
Implicature also plays an essential role in getting
 
readers to identify with Miss Manners, and rhetorically. Miss
 
Manners' personality is an important factor in convincing
 
people to mind their manners. Because she opts to use
 
implicature instead of simply giving the information in the
 
most obvious manner, she fosters a feeling of camaraderie
 
with her readers, because her answers seem to show her witty
 
personality and because she seems to be sharing an "inside
 
joke" with her readers. Her reference to Mies van der Rohe
 
is a good example of this. The readers who understand the
 
reference may be impressed by Miss Manners' clever and funny
 
implicature, but they are also pleased and flattered that
 
they are clever enough and educated enough to unravel and
 
fully understand the implicature themselves. Readers feel as
 
if they are initiated into an exclusive and intellectual
 
group; they become part of the "in crowd." Consequently,
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they gain a vested interest in Miss Manners, and they are
 
inclined to take her advice more seriously.
 
Implicature, therefore, is an important tool which and
 
Judith Martin, through her character Miss Manners, uses to
 
reach her underlying gbais. Miss Manners' humorous
 
implicature> becdus'S:it fdsters feeling of camaraderie^ makes
 
her more persuasive as she continues her crusade to have
 
people be more polite to one another and be more socially
 
responsible. Also, it is important not to forget that Miss
 
Manners' personality is created by Judith Martin, whose
 
ulterior motives seem to be the same as Miss Manners', but
 
with the additional motive of marketability. Judith Martin
 
sells her books and columns, so she wants people to like Miss
 
Manners and to find Miss Manners entertaining so that people
 
will want to buy the Miss Manners books. Ultimately, Miss
 
Manners' violation of the maxim of relation and the resulting
 
implicature come to make Judith Martin a great deal of money,
 
and also expose many people to the rules of correct social
 
behavior in a form that makes etiquette palatable.
 
Part B: What Toulmin Said
 
Toulmin devised a new model of argument which has proved
 
to be a useful way to understand how practical, everyday
 
arguments work. He built a model composed of six elements —
 
grounds, claim, warrant, backing, modality, and rebuttal
 
which could be used as a way of outlining ordinary argtiments
 
to see how people travel logically from the grounds of an
 
argument to the claim of the argument (see figure 1).
 
Similar to Grice's implicature, Toulmin's model of argument
 
takes into account an arguer's background knowledge,
 
including information that may be left unstated.
 
Toulmin's model of argxmient is perhaps most easily
 
explained by starting with the base three elements: the
 
grounds, claim, and warrant. Generallyf they are diagramed
 
with grounds and claim connected On a horizontal axis
 
(grounds on the left end and claim On the right), and the
 
warrant is between and slightly^ove the other two elements
 
on a line se^went perpendicular to the horizontal
 
grounds/claita axis. Not surprisingly, to those who have
 
studied argument, grounds are "the specific facts relied on
 
to support a given claim" (Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik,
 
Introduction 33), while claims are "assertions put forward
 
publicly for general acceptance" (Toulmin. Rieke, and Janik,
 
Introduction 29). In addition to these more obvious elements
 
of argument, Toulmin added a third, the warrant, which is
 
defined as "the portion of the argument [which] authorizes
 
our movement from the grounds to the claim. It answers the
 
question, how do you justify the move from these grounds to
 
that claim?" (Foss, Foss, and Trapp, 100).
 
It is the last of this group of three elements, the
 
warrant, which is the most crucial part of Toulmin's model of
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argument. This element differentiates Toulmin's model of
 
argument from other models of argument, particularly the
 
traditional, formal modes of argument. The warrant is
 
critical to Toulmin's model because it takes into account the
 
idea that there is movement between the grounds and the
 
claim; one's mind must fill in the gap between the grounds
 
and the claim in order to make the leap in logic from the
 
grounds to the claim. To give an example of a warrant, take
 
the claim, "Joseph will not be in class today," and the
 
ground, "because his car has broken down." The warrant,
 
which is unstated, is that Joseph need his car to travel to
 
school, and this warrant allows the logical movement from the
 
grounds to the claim.
 
The warrant is an element that may or may not actually
 
be stated as part of the argument (while in formal logic all
 
the crucial parts of the argument would be stated). A
 
warrant may be unstated because it is background knowledge,
 
which the arguer may assume that other people share and,
 
therefore, is deemed by the arguer unnecessary to state. It
 
may seem to the arguer that the warrant is too obvious to
 
state or question.
 
If we return to Toulmin's diagram to fill in the
 
additional three elements in his model of argument, we will
 
have a simple illustration of how backing, modality, and
 
rebuttal relate to the base three elements, the grounds,
 
claim, and warrant.
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Backing is located right above the warrant on the same
 
vertical line as the warrant in order to illustrate that it
 
supports the warrant. Modality is located on the horizontal
 
line which connects the grounds and claim, but it is centered
 
between the warrant and the claim in order to show that
 
modality explains how likely it is that the leap from the
 
grounds to the claim is a sound one. Lastly, rebuttal is
 
located dirOctly below modality on a perpendicular line
 
segment to show how some circimistances may completely derail
 
the argument sO that the trip from the grounds to the claim
 
would not be possible.
 
This second group of three of Toulmin's elements of
 
argument, backing, modality, and rebuttal, also distinguishes
 
Toulmin's model from traditional or formal models because
 
these elements are designed to deal with issues of context
 
which do not arise in formal argument (Foss, Foss, and Trapp
 
101). Since formal logic deals with universal truths, which
 
do not change, the traditional models (i.e. the syllogism)
 
did not need these elements. However, since Toulmin designed
 
his model to break down practical argiaments, he had to deal
 
with the problems of context, including uncertainty, which
 
occur in everyday arguments. In his model of argument the
 
elements of backing, modality, and rebuttal take into account
 
context and uncertainty and make them part of the model.
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Backing is the "explicit...body of experience relied on
 
to establish the trustworthiness," or soundness of a warrant
 
(Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, Introduction 57). Toulmin points
 
out that "warrants are not self-validating." and, therefore,
 
it is necessary to have backing to show that a warrant is
 
sound and relevant to the case being examined (Toulmin,
 
Rieke, and Janik, Introduction 58). While a warrant may be
 
very specific to the case, i.e. "Joseph needs his car to
 
travel to school," backing usually consists of more general
 
background knowledge and the larger context of the argument,
 
i*e. "Joseph lives 20 miles from school, walking 20 miles to
 
school is beyond the stamina and time allowances of most
 
people, and mass transit is unavailable in Joseph's area"
 
(notice that just as warrants are often left unstated, the
 
backing is also often left unstated). A warrant specifically
 
states how one can get from the grounds to the claim, but the
 
grounds show that the warrant is sound.
 
Modality is the part of the argument that explains how
 
likely it is that the grounds will indeed lead to the claim.
 
Toulmin says, "every argument has a certain modality. By the
 
use of this term, we refer to the strength or weakness,
 
conditions, and/or limitations with which a claim is advanced
 
(Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, Introduction 70). Furthermore,
 
this modality is often put forth in an argument by using one
 
of
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a familiar set of colloquial adverbs and adverbial
 
phrases that are customarily used to mark these
 
modalities — as modal qualifiers or modifiers ...
 
[including]...
 
—necessarily
 
—certainly
 
—presumably
 
—in all probability
 
—so far as the evidence goes
 
—for all that we can tell
 
—very likely
 
—very possibly
 
—maybe
 
—apparently
 
—plausibly
 
—or so it seems
 
(Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, Introduction 70-71].
 
To continue the example argument that Joseph will not be
 
in class because his car has broken down, it is understood
 
that Joseph most likely will not be able to come to class,
 
because, as far as the arguer knows, Joseph has no
 
transportation to class.
 
This brings us to the last of Toulmin's elements,
 
rebuttals, which can be thought of simply as the spoilers of
 
arguments. Toulmin says rebuttals are the "extraordinary or
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exceptional circumstances that might undermine the force of
 
the supporting arguments," (Toulmin,Rieke, and Janik,
 
Introduction 75V. Iii other yords, the leap from the grounds
 
to the claim may only be logical, and the argument itself
 
valid, in the absence of the certain exceptional
 
circumstances known as the rebuttal.
 
If we return to the example Of Joseph and his broken-

down car, a rebuttal would be that Yvonne is picking Joseph
 
up and driving him to school for his class. Suddenly,
 
because of this rebuttel/ the argument that Joseph will not
 
be in class today because his car brote down is invalid. It
 
is unlikely that the claim that Joseph will not be in class
 
will be met, because the assumption that Joseph will not have
 
transportation is disproven, so the basis for the leap from
 
the grounds to the claim is suddenly gone.
 
Let us look at an example, one that Toulirdn himself
 
used, that illustrates how Toulmin's model is unlike formal
 
argument and also involves knowledge that might seem obvious
 
from Toulmin's British perspective of a few decades ago, but
 
is not as obvious to your average southern California native.
 
Toulmin starts out with his grounds, warrant, and claim:
 
"Harry was born in Bermuda"...(grounds]...A man bom in
 
Bermuda will be a British subject...[warrant]...So...Harry is
 
a British subject [claim] (Toulmin Uses 99).
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As Foss, Fobs, and Trapp point out, "Alone, these three
 
primary elements fail to distinguish analytical from
 
practical argxments." In fact they took these three elements
 
and from them made a formal syllogism;
 
Major Premise: A man born in Bermuda will be a British 
citizen [sic]. 
Minor Premise: Harry was born in Bermuda. 
Conclusion: Harry is a British citizen [sic]. (101)
 
However, as in the last example of Joseph getting to
 
class, the additions of the backing, modality, rebuttal to
 
this example "complete the layout of an argument by showing
 
how practical arguments are contextualized and, thus, are
 
different from analytical argxmients" (Foss 101).
 
The backing in this case, the laws and national
 
influence, that cause a person born in Bermuda to be a
 
British subject are crucial to understanding why the warrant
 
is valid, particularly for someone who is not familiar with
 
Bermuda or the details of how Bermuda fits into British
 
imperialistic history. Also, the backing is necessary to
 
bring context to the argximent, because this argument is not
 
immutable truth; Bermuda has not always been under the
 
control of England, and it may not always continue to be so.
 
The modality and rebuttal also add additional context
 
necessary to understand how likely it is that this practical
 
argioment is correct, in other words, that the claim will
 
follow from the grounds. The modality in this example,
 
24
 
"prestraiably," indicates the strength of the likelihood that
 
the claim will follow from the grounds fToulmin Uses 105).
 
The term "presumably" is not the strongest of modal
 
qualifiers. It leaves open the possibility that the claim
 
may not follow from the grounds. This is where the rebuttal
 
comes in. The rebuttal, the conditions which would prevent
 
the conclusion from following from the claim in this argioment
 
that Harry is a British subject, are "Unless...Both his
 
parents were aliens/ he has becomes a naturalised [sic]
 
American" (Toulmin Uses 105). If either of these conditions
 
is met the argxament is spoiled; the claim that "Harry is a
 
British subject" cannot be logically expected to follow
 
because either of these conditions would effect Harry's
 
citizenship (Toulmin Uses 99). In the first case, he might
 
be expected to share the citizenship of one or both his
 
parents, and in the second Harry would be an American
 
citizen.
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Chapter Two: How Grice's and Toulmin's Ideas are Alike
 
The presence of conversational implicature must be
 
capable of being worked out; for even if it can be
 
intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is
 
replaceable by argument, the implicature (if
 
present at all) will not count as a conversational
 
implicature... (Grice 31)
 
Inferring in a phrase, does not always involve
 
calculating, and the canons of sound argument can
 
be applied alike whether we have reached our
 
conclusions by way of a computation or by a simple
 
leap. For logic is concerned not with the manner
 
of our inferring, or with questions of technique:
 
its primary business is...retrospective...
 
(Toulmin, Uses 6)
 
There are some striking similarities between Grice'S
 
implicature and Toulmin's warrants that seem to prove that
 
both processes work in the same way and that the ideas of
 
both se«n to overlap and confirm each other. As the
 
preceding quotes illustrate> Grice talks about the importance
 
of argument, and Toulmin talks about the validity of
 
inference. Neither process excludes the other; rather, they
 
seem to be manifestations of the same larger processes of
 
using background knowledge to fill in gaps in understanding
 
and logic.
 
Ultimately, implicature and warrants show how the
 
meaning is not in words or/ in the logical
 
interpretatibn of background knowledge. When a shaker or
 
writer tries to communicate or argue an idea, what is said is
 
usually not stated in a truly literal and explicit way.
 
Consequently, the first similarity that is readily apparent
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between both implicature and unstated warrants is that in
 
both there is a "gap" in the infomation given to a
 
listener/reader bhat must be "filled in" or bridged. A
 
second obyious similarity between implicature and unstated
 
warrants is that the information supplied by the listener or
 
reader and used to fill in the gap has a large effect on the
 
meaning interpreted. The reader's/listener's perspective or
 
reasoning may lead to either a subtly or wildly different
 
interpretation of a statement. (We will look at a detailed
 
example of this in the next chapter,) Paul Grice's theory of
 
conversational implicature and Stephen Toulmin's model of
 
argument each take into account the unstated assumptions
 
which speakers/ writers, audiences, and readers carry in
 
their minds and use in order to interpret language.
 
A further similarity is that the "gap" in the two
 
processes seems to be of a similar nature. If we return to
 
two earlier examples this is evident (Fig. 5). The example
 
given of implicature is, when asked if Mike is home, a
 
speaker replies, "His car is parked in the driveway,"
 
assuming that the hearer will infer that Mike must be home.
 
An example Toulmin gives of implicature is very similar; he
 
looks at the logical argument of the commonly used metaphor,
 
"where there is smoke, there is fire." In both cases, while
 
the leap in logic can be made intuitively, or perhaps be
 
dismissed as "common sense," the logic behind the leap can be
 
worked out in retrospective using the background knowledge
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 the speaker or writer assumes of the listener or reader. In
 
both cases, the trail of connections is apparent. Mike uses
 
his car to get around, and smoke is a by-product of something
 
burning, which requires a flame or other source of extreme
 
heat. In each, the presence of one thing indicates the
 
presence of something else.
 
There also seems to be a parallelism between Grice's
 
maxiums and what might be thought of as maxims of
 
understanding warrants and backing of arguments in Touimin's
 
model (Fig. 6). In the two preceeding, and all, cases of
 
implicature and unstated v^rrantb, the logic of the speaker
 
or writer may be worked out by taking into account unstated
 
assumptions which speakers, writers, audiences, and readers
 
carry in their minds and employ in order to interpret
 
language. Grice isolates four maxiias: quantity (speaker
 
giving enough infoirmation), quality (speaker not passing
 
along information that the speaker believes is false or
 
information for which the speaker lacks evidence), relation
 
(speaker being relevant to the current topic), and manner
 
(speaker presenting information in a clear, unambiguous,
 
orderly, and easy to understand manner) (28). He says that,
 
when a maxim is flouted, it causes an instance of
 
conversational implicature (Grice 30).
 
Toulmin does not neatly subdivide the categories of
 
warrant as Grice has done for implicature. Toulmin simply
 
defines a warrant as "the portion of the argument [that]
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authorizes our movement from the grounds to the claim. It
 
answers the question, how do you justify the move from these
 
grounds to that claim?" (Foss, Foss, and Trapp, 100).
 
However, unstated warrants, their backing, and conversational
 
implicature rely on the same sorts of information. If a
 
person wishes to make a good argument, one that will convince
 
others rationally, then he or she must obey the cooperative
 
principle in order to communicate effectively with other
 
people. By leaving things unstated in an argument, a
 
speaker/writer may be flouting the cooperative principle or,
 
in effect, flouting the conventions of making a clear
 
argument which allows the logic of the argument to be
 
followed by the hearer or reader. The cooperative principle
 
seems to be similarly vital to understanding communication
 
and argument alike. I would further suggest, for the sake of
 
comparison, that for Toulmin's warrant we could have three
 
"maxims" of understanding logic: past experiences, beliefs,
 
and values (Fig. 6).
 
This idea seems to point out another striking similarity
 
between implicature and warrants, which is the process of how
 
the mind is able to apply extended background and extended
 
context or what might often be dismissed as "common sense."
 
Grice and Toulmin each bring up the extreme importance of
 
background knowledge, including the understanding of context,
 
to fill in the gap that occurs between the utterance and its
 
meaning or the premise and its conclusion. It should be
 
29
 
remembered that background knowledge includes common
 
experience at the local level (such as a family, a group of
 
friends, people who attended the same school, or a people
 
from the same city) or the shared experience could be at a
 
larger level (everyone who shows horses, everyone in a
 
particular social class in India, everyone in the United
 
States of America, everyone in Eastern Europe, all mothers,
 
all humankind). Also vital to understanding is a common
 
history and/or belief system for people to draw direction
 
from. Stories, real and embellished, from the past,
 
religion, and myths all play a part in how human beings
 
interpret what they see and hear in the world around them.
 
It is important to have these things in order for people to
 
decide what their origin is, what their purpose is, what
 
goals they should have, what is right, what is wrong, what is
 
better, and what is worse. Both Grice and Toulmin show that
 
understanding is not foUnd in words and phrases as much as in
 
a person's past experiences, beliefs, and grasp of context.
 
In the next chapter, we will look further into how background
 
knowledge, using mental models, is stored for use and the
 
mental process of recalling and using this background
 
knowledge. It seems that another similarity between
 
implicature and warrants is the underlying process involved
 
in filling in missing background knowledge taken from mental
 
models.­
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 An additional similarity between Grice's implicature and
 
Toulmin's warrants, which will be expounded upon in the
 
following chapter, is that both allow for an understanding of
 
communication and logic that those rigid formal models could
 
not. Ti^at formal logic gained in irrefutability, it lost in
 
impracticality. Formal logic's procrustean approach of
 
leaving out whatever does not fit into the model makes it
 
oftentimes impractical in real life argument and in
 
understanding the logic of real life conversation because it
 
oversimplifies complex issues.
 
As I pointed out in the introduction, there are many
 
striking similarities between Grice's idea of conversational
 
implicature and Toulmin's model of argument, particularly
 
warrants. First, Grice and Toulmin's ideas hinge on
 
explaining how people are able to "travel" or "leap" from
 
premise to conclusion. Also, both consciously recognize that
 
there is a leap, both see the leap as being of the same
 
nature, and additionally, both offer similar explanations as
 
to how the gaps are filled in so that the leap can be
 
completed. Lastly, 1 believe that underlying both
 
implicature and warrants is the use of mental models.
 
The similarity is not all that surprising since both
 
Grice and Toulmin are philosophers reacting against formal
 
logic and making a map of the practical logic people employ
 
every day as a part of daily living. Whereas formal logic
 
strives, through equations of nearly mathematical precision
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such as irrefutable, internal syllogisms, to produce a ideal
 
and unquestionable form of logic, it is not terribly
 
practical in everyday life, where courses of action and
 
circxamstance are usually neither irrefutable nor eternal.
 
Toulmin and Grice were looking not at some perfect ideal of
 
how communication or argument should be, but instead they
 
were looking at how communicatiom actually worked in everyday
 
life. They saw there were systems, logical systems, which
 
were used in everyday, normal conversation and argiament.
 
They were not concerned with building some ideal model of
 
conversation or argxament for hxaman beings to strive toward;
 
instead, they were interested in finding the logic
 
instinctively applied in conversation and argxament. Rather
 
than condemning hxamankind for being irrational, they strove
 
to find the rational systems that were already being
 
employed. Grice and Toulmin's practical looks at the process
 
of interpersonal communication give us an insightful view
 
intohow language, only a single part of the communication of
 
meaning, works along with the wide variety of shifting
 
physical and societal variables of context which are
 
incorporated into the background knowledge a reader/listener
 
uses to understand communication and argxaments*
 
However, what is a bit surprising about the similarities
 
between the ideas of Grice and Toulmin is that they were
 
working in different fieldSf linguistics and argxament,
 
respectively, looking at different problems, conversation and
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legal argument, but they came to quite similar conclusions.
 
One Seems to confirm and validate the other, so that they
 
transend being just myopic, field-specific theories. Grice's
 
and Toulmin's ideas also, seem to link nicely to yet another
 
field, psychology, where they receive some additional
 
validation from, and add to the understanding of, the idea of
 
mental models.
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Warrant
 
Grounds Claxm
 
Figure 1. Toulmin's three basic elements of argument.
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Backing
 
warrant
 
Grounds
 Modality Claim
 
Rebuttal
 
Figure 2. Toulmin's entire model of argument.
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Warrant
 
A man born in
 
Bermuda wil1 be a
 
British Subject
 
Grounds Claim
 
Harry was Harry is
 
born in a British
 
Bermuda Subject
 
Figure 3. Three basic elements in Toulmin's "British
 
subject" example.
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Backing
 
The following statutes and
 
other legal provisions:
 
Warrant
 
A man born in Bermuda
 
will be a British subject
 
Grounds Claim
 
Harry was Modality Harry is a
 
born in so, British
 
Bermuda presumably subject
 
Rebuttal
 
Unless both his parents
 
were aliens or he has
 
become a naturalized
 
American
 
Figure 4. Toulmin's entire "British subject" example.
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 Chapter Three; Mental Models Underlying Grice's Implicature
 
and Toulmih's Warrants
 
The world, to a large extent, is a vision of
 
our own creation. We inhabit a mixed realm of
 
sensation and interpretation, and the boundary
 
between them is never openly revealed to us.
 
iUld amid th situation, bur cortex
 
makes up little stories about the world, and
 
softly htims them to us to keep us from getting
 
scared;at-, night •
 
^ . 'Leif Finkle '
 
The ideas of Paul Grice and Stephen Toulmin seem to
 
point out that human beings use en incredible amount of
 
background knc^ledge to communicate and make decisions. What
 
is interesting ebout this is that, a great deal of the time,
 
people are unconscious about the fact that they are employing
 
background knowledge at all. The background knowledge that
 
people acquire, and which may or may not be true, seems to be
 
part of a person's mental model of the world. It seems that
 
these n^ntal models of the world are a key way human beings
 
store background knowledge, After all, it is impossible for
 
people to start each conversation or argument with an
 
entirely clear mental slate because argument and conversation
 
would slow to an impractical pace. What might have taken a
 
few seconds to say would take all day if people had to
 
explain the chain of facts and assumptions underneath what
 
was said in each conversation or argument. Even the
 
seemingly simplest of exchanges could take an entire day to
 
explain and analyze; hence, background knowledge has to be
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stored in case a situation in which that knowledge might be
 
needed arises.
 
The idea of mental models seems to have multi­
disciplinary support. The fields of psychology and
 
linguistics have long used the concept of mental models to
 
explain how individuals are able to conceptualize the way
 
processes or machines work and try to understand how the
 
human brain understands and interprets language.
 
Additionally, individuals manipulate mental models in order
 
to predict the possible outcome of events, which makes these
 
models important for reasoning and argument as well.
 
While the idea of mental models may, at first glance,
 
seem more theoretical and scientific than Grice's and
 
Toumlin's more practical theories, in reality mental models
 
are not. In fact, mental models seem to employ background
 
knowledge in a way similar to Grice's implicature or
 
Toulmin's warrants and their backing. For an everyday
 
example of how people employ background knowledge to make a
 
simple model, I will use my own experience. I recently was
 
putting a load of wet laundry in the clothes dryer when the
 
cable that holds the dryer door closed snapped. Of course,
 
the dryer will not run if the door is not closed tightly, so
 
I looked at the position of the door and guessed that I would
 
need something long and heavy to wedge up against the door to
 
keep it closed. I wandered out into the family room to look
 
for an object that might do this. Mentally, I wedged an
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assortment of chairs door of the dryer, but by
 
using my model I could see that they were all too short or
 
light. Then i cast^ m^ eyes on the heavy llexidan barstdbls at
 
the kitchen counter. I pictured one of them wedged up
 
against the dryer door in my model and it was a perfect fit,
 
so I lugged it to the dryer and it worked to keep the door
 
shut so I could finish drying my clothes. The problem I was
 
presented with was how to keep the door closed, but the
 
background knowledge I had to employ involved knowing the
 
approximately weight of the objects without lifting them,
 
knowing the angle I would need between the door and the floor
 
to make a wedge that could hold the door closed despite the
 
wet clothes being thrown up against the door, and so on. I
 
am not an engineer, but based on my experiences in everyday
 
life situations, I could take information stored in my mind
 
and mentally make a picture or model and manipulate it until
 
I found a solution to my problem. Obviously, mental models
 
like this are quite useful because they save people the hard
 
labor of trial and error. In this instance, I only had to
 
carry one chair to the dryer rather than Cariying several,
 
and I was able to use my model to decide how to prop the door
 
Shut.;.'
 
The idea of mental models is definitely not new to
 
linguists who are looking at how background knowledge works.
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In Discourse Analysis. Gillian Brown and George Yule say
 
that.
 
There have been several attempts to provide
 
conventional or stereotypic representations of
 
"knowledge of the world" as a basis for the
 
interpretation of discourse. These
 
representations, found in psychological and
 
computational approaches to discourse
 
understanding, are mainly used to account for the
 
type of the predictable information a writer /
 
speaker can assume his hearer / listener has
 
available whenever a particular situation is
 
described. (236)
 
Brown and Yule divide these "representations" of knowledge
 
into several different theories, such as "frames," "scripts,"
 
"scenarios,'V "sch^ata^" and "mental models." However, each
 
involves some soft of mental model or contextual association,
 
and the differentiation between the groups is not of great
 
concern here because the ideas tend to overlap and be
 
variations on the theme of mental models.
 
Philip N. Johnson-Laird, author of Mental Models, takes
 
a more psychological approach to mental models. What he says
 
about inference^ in relation to mental ihodels, echoes what
 
both Grice and Toulmin say about the role of inference and
 
logic in relation to their own theories (see the introduction
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of this thesis). Johnson-Laird points out that, "Valid
 
inferences were made long before the invention of logic;
 
[sic] and tdiey can be made without relying, consciously or
 
unconsciously, on rules Of inference," and believes
 
"inferences hre based onmental models" (Johnson-Laird,
 
Mental 126). Further, he says, "There is an important
 
distinction between two sorts of inference that occur in
 
daily life" IMental 127). On the one hand, there are the
 
explicit inferences, in which, "You must make a voluntary
 
decision to try to make than^ They may take time and they
 
are at the forefront of your awareness." On the other hand,
 
implicit inferences are "the inferences that underlie the
 
more muhdane processes of intuitive judgment and the
 
comprehension of discourse tend to be rapid, effortlessv and
 
outside conscious awareness" (Johnson-Laird, Mental 127).
 
Two examples of the use of these "mundane processes" would#
 
of course, be filling in the unstated gaps in cases of
 
implicature and in everyday argiamehts.
 
Mental models, like Grice's conversational implicature
 
and Toulmin's model of argument, involve a leap in logic that
 
may con^ either instantly and intuitively or may be worked
 
out with painstaking logic. This, along with the other
 
similarities, suggest that Grice's implicature and Toulmin's
 
model of argument are only the surface manifestations of a
 
much larger and more complex process of storing and using
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mental models composed of background knowledge. This idea,
 
that there is some larger network of background knowledge or
 
a series of mental models, is one that is often hinted at.
 
For instance, Brovm and Yule suggest that.
 
We might just say that the knowledge that we
 
possess as users of a language concerning social
 
interaction via language is just part of our
 
general socio-cultureal knowledge. This general
 
knowledge about the world underpins our
 
interpretation not only of discourse, but virtually
 
every aspect of our experience. (233)
 
I believe that, when studied together and considered in .
 
the context of their relationship to mental models, Toulmin
 
and Grice's ideas show that human beings have the capacity to
 
build much more complex series of models than have been
 
previously explored. Even Brown and Yule admit;
 
that, until we can develop experimental techniques
 
which allow us to draw conclusions about how people
 
process naturally occurring discourse in 'real­
life' contexts, we shall continue to underdetermine
 
human understanding and overindulge our simplistic
 
analytical metaphors. This applies not only to the
 
nature of inference, but to the more general
 
concept of comprehension itself. (269)
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Johnson-Laird makes an even more compelling case for how
 
little human beings know about their own brains and how they
 
work. It is as if we are the most ignorant about ourselves:
 
At the beginning of this book, I raised the
 
perplexing argument that the mind must be more
 
complicated than any theory of it: however complex
 
the theory, a device that invented it must be still
 
more complex. Obviously, cognitive scientists aim
 
to understand the mind — to have a mental model of
 
a device that makes mental models. There is a
 
striking similarity between this goal and the
 
achievement of self-awareness: the mind is aware
 
of the mind. It understands itself at least to
 
some extent, and it understands that it understands
 
itself...The idea is both central to the subjective
 
experience of consciousness and paradoxical. It
 
resembles the puzzle of the inclusive map: if a
 
large map bf England were to be traced out in
 
accurate detail on the middle of Salisbury Plain,
 
then it should contain a representation of
 
itself...and so ad infinitxm, (Johnson-Laird,
 
Mental 438)
 
Using mental models is a clever way the human brain
 
stores and manipulates background knowledge in order to use
 
that knowledge to interpret, reason, or solve problems. Two
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examples where the use of these mental models can be seen are
 
Grice's Implicature and Toulmin's unstated warrants. It is
 
in the form of these mental models that listeners/readers
 
store the background knowledge they need to fill in the gaps
 
of information when faced with implicature or everyday
 
argument. The word "model" is deceptive in a way because
 
these models are not like the static models that people might
 
build of wood, plastic, clay or wood. They may not even be
 
something that can be seen visually with the mind's eye, but
 
they are rather connected bits of information. These models
 
are fluid and shifting with the background knowledge flowing
 
into them at an incomprehensible (and, possibly, unconscious)
 
pace. New information is added and new focuses brought into
 
view as fast as dendrites can fire. Within the model,
 
additional models and analogies can be built and examined.
 
This is similar to watching Pop Up Videos on VHl, because
 
objects within the music videos have dialog balloons which
 
"pop up" on the screen and impart additional information, a
 
subtext, about the video. Mental models might additionally
 
be compared to opening a document on a computer's hard drive,
 
then opening several other docuinents to search for passage to
 
copy, pasting that passage into the first document, and
 
running the spell check, /these comparisons are somewhat
 
simplistic compared to the multitasking the human brain is
 
capable of, but they show how models can be built within
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models and how information from a multitude of models can be
 
opened at the same time. Brown and Yule say something
 
similar about background knowledge:
 
It then became possible to think of knowledge-of­
the-world, as organized into separate but
 
interlinked sets of knowledge areas which, taken
 
together, would add up to the generalized knowledge
 
that humans, in comprehending discourse, appear to
 
.. •;UBe.:" (.237) y ■ 
Mental models underlie both Grice's implicature and
 
Toulmin's model of arg\imenti if we look back at some of the
 
earlier examples given in this thesis it is easy to see the
 
connections. The example in which the speaker is implying
 
that Mike is home because h parked in his driveway
 
can easily fit into the idea of the mental model. Based on
 
the background knowledge that the speaker and the hearer
 
share about Mike and the location of his ear, they can
 
construct similar models of what is happening if Mike's car
 
is parked in Mike's driveway. While using cars as indicators
 
to see if Someone is home is not entirely accurate, it is
 
common because we use our cars for travel. Cars, therefore,
 
are associated with our current location. If we go back to
 
Toulmin's argument of "where there is smoke there is fire," a
 
mental model could easily be employed there, as well (Fig.
 
5). While there is a scientific explanation Of what fire is
 
and why it necessarily produces smoke, most people associate
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smoke and fire because of their life experiences rather than
 
scientific fact. These past experiences have been filed away
 
as background knowledge, and therefore, most people Ccin
 
quickly bring up the mental model that shows that smoke
 
denotes fire. Smoke and fire are so closely associated with
 
one another, that, most likely, smoke and fire will be
 
"stored in the memory as a single, easily accessible unit"
 
(Brown and Yule 236). Just the smell of smoke instantly
 
brings a realization that there might be a fire.
 
It is significant that mental models can be placed as
 
the force underlying both Grice's implicature and Toulmin's
 
warrants, because it shows how prevalent and critical mental
 
models are for human beings to interpret the world and to
 
communicate with one another. In fact, it is from these
 
underlying models, I would argue, that people extract their
 
interpretations of meaning and their sense of reality, what
 
is real or unreal, and what is likely or unlikely. Human
 
beings, in essence, construct their own realities, which vary
 
from person to person, but also, in most cases, conform to
 
the normal variations one might expect in a society. I
 
believe that from the time humans are bornr they are
 
constructing their individual models of the world, and each
 
experience they have helps them shape their ideas of what the
 
world is like. If a person lives in an impoverished and
 
gang-ridden neighborhood, that person's model of the world is
 
going to be different from the model of someone who lives in
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a comfortable, middle-class neighborhood. What is considered
 
normal, everyday life would be different for these two people
 
because they are exposed to differing environments. For
 
instance, the person who lives in the lower income
 
neighborhood might see that "everybody" goes out and tries to
 
get a job after high school, while the person from the
 
middle-class neighborhood might think "everybody" goes to
 
college. Generally, it would seem that the person in the
 
better neighborhood probably would have a more positive view
 
of the world. People take what they see around them and use
 
that to form their mental models of the world.
 
What makes mental models particularly useful for
 
reasoning and comprehension is that the background knowledge
 
called up for a current situation does not have to come from
 
a situation identical to the one a person is currently
 
facing. Information gained in a similar experience can be
 
applied to a new situation, for example the experiences a
 
person had when starting at a new school could be used when
 
that person starts a new job. As far as deciphering
 
discourse. Brown and Yule say that, "the interpretation of
 
discourse is based to a large extent on a simple principle of
 
analogy with what wd have experienced in the past" (233).
 
The bits of background knowledge that are used to
 
compose mental models appear to be stored in relevant groups.
 
(This is not to say the information is only accessible if a
 
person opens the right model since information can be
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relevant in more than one situation or analogical
 
experience.) Brown and Yule say.
 
It is a feature of these knowledge representations
 
that they are organized in a fixed way as a
 
complete unit of stereotypic knowledge in memory.
 
Thus knowledge of a restaurant scene is treated as
 
being stored in memory as a single, easily
 
accessible unit, rather than as a scattered
 
collection of individual facts which have to be
 
assembled from different parts of memory each time
 
a restaurant scene is mentioned. (236)
 
Mental models wOrk as a fast way to bring up bits of possibly
 
relevant information from which people can then quickly pick
 
the information they need and discard the irrelevant
 
infomation. It is somewhat similar to carrying a whole tool
 
box to a home improvement project, because then all the
 
necessary tools are there where the work is to be done, if
 
people bring one tool at a time to the location of the
 
project, then much time and energy can be wasted going back
 
and forth to the garage. Blocks of information are faster to
 
deal with than a trickle of facts, some of which are relevant
 
and some of which are not.
 
However, I believe mental models, as wonderful and
 
undeniably useful as they seem to be, may be a major factor
 
in miscommunication and unsound decision making, because
 
ultimately humans' mental models of the world are substituted
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for the real world. As Grice's implicature is used like a
 
shorthand of communication through language, so the models
 
are the "shorthand" for reality. This is where problems can
 
begin because either the analogy or model may not correspond
 
well enough with the Current situation that a person is
 
facing, or the model may not accurately reflect the real
 
world. Analogies tend to be inherently risky and need to be
 
thought out carefully because what works in one situation may
 
not work in another, but the more insidious problem is what a
 
person views as real or possible, or as unreal or impossible,
 
may not be.
 
Brown and Yule touch on one of the potential problems of
 
mental models when they discuss a type of model called the
 
schemata, which they define as "organized background
 
knowledge which leads us to expect or predict aspects in our
 
interpretation of discourse" (248). As we all know from real
 
life experiences, what we expect is hot necessarily going to
 
be fulfilled. Human beings' expectations can lead them to
 
interpret an utterance or text differently from the intended
 
meaning or to interpret a situation incorrectly. According
 
to Brown and Yule,
 
In the strong view, schemata are considered to be
 
deterministic, to predispose the experiencer to
 
interpret his experience in a fixed way. We can
 
think of racial prejudice, for example, as the
 
manifestation of some fixed way of thinking about
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newly encountered individuals who are assigned
 
undesirable attributes and motives based motives on
 
the basis of an existing schema for members of the
 
race. (247)
 
Expectations flood our lives though we may not
 
consciously think about them. If a person puts on a jacket,
 
that person expects to be warmer. If a person takes a first
 
bite of an ice cream sundae, that person expects the ice
 
cream to taste sweet. If person turns on a TV set, that
 
person expects the W program to be in a specific leinguage/
 
like English. If a person goes to the mall the day before
 
Christmas, that person expects the mall to be crowded and
 
busy. If a per^dn pays his or her electric bill, that person
 
expects uninterrupted electricity< The expectations for the
 
jacket and the ice cream may be scientifically explained, but
 
the Other expectations may or may nob be fulfilled depending
 
on a number of societal and contextual factors, and, of
 
course, expectations may vary from place to place or person
 
to person. Here in Southern California, if someone is
 
invited to a barbecue, that person might correctly ej^ect
 
that beef hot dogs, beef hamburgers, or beef steaks will be
 
served. However, if that barbecue was being held in Hindu
 
India, where cows are considered sacred, it is highly
 
unlikely beef will be served. However, there is no need to
 
travel to another continent to see expectations clash (and
 
communication suffers!). Most married couples have had to
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negotiate clashing expectations for celebrating
 
anniversaries, spending vacations, decorating houses, etc.
 
The problem with expectations is that what a person expects
 
may not be fulfilled in some situations; therefore, the
 
interpretation or the decision a person makes based on that
 
expectation may be incorrect.
 
Brown and Yule look at an interesting case that
 
illustrates the idea that differing expectations leading to
 
different interpretations are not "caused by different
 
cultural backgrounds alone" (Brown & Yule 248). The
 
following passage is part of passage that was given to two
 
different groups of students who "had very similar cultural
 
backgrounds," but who were expected to have different
 
interests (Brown & Yule 248):
 
Every Saturday night, four good friends get
 
together. When Jerry, Mike, and Pat arrived, Karen
 
was sitting in her living room writing some notes.
 
She quickly gathered up her cards and stood up to
 
meet her friends at the door. They followed her
 
into the living room but as usual they couldn't
 
agree on exactly what to play. Jerry eventually
 
took a stand and set things up. Finally, they
 
began to play. Karen's recorder filled the room
 
with a soft and pleasant music. Early in the
 
evening, Mike noticed Pat's hand and the many
 
diamonds...(Anderson et al., 1977: 372)
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The two groups who receive the passage were "a group of
 
female students who were plahhing a career in music" and "a
 
group of male students from a weight-lifting class." As
 
might be expected, the former group favored interpreting the
 
passage as being about a "musical evening," while the latter
 
group "preferred an interpretation in which the passage
 
described some people playing cards rather than musical
 
instruments" (Brown & Yule 248). The two groups' differing
 
interests and experiences led them to have different
 
expectations and, therefore, differing interpretations.
 
Faulty "default elements" are another, similar way that
 
expectations can lead people to interpret an utterance or
 
text differently from the intended meaning or to make an
 
incorrect assumption about a situation. Default elements are
 
the bits of information that we take for granted as being a
 
part of a text or situation. Brown and Yule say, "These
 
default elements will be assumed to be present, even when not
 
mentioned, unless the reader / hearer is specially told
 
otherwise" (Brown & Yule 236). To illustrate, they use the
 
following:
 
Given one particular situation, such as a
 
restaurant scene, the writer / speaker should not
 
have to inform his reader / hearer that there are
 
tables and chairs in the restaurant, or that one
 
orders and pays for the food consumed therein. In
 
representations of this knowledge, conventional
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aspects of a situation, such as tables and chairs
 
in a restaurant, can be treated as default
 
elements. (Brown & Yule 236)
 
When default elements do not correspond to reality, faulty
 
conclusions are reached. Taking advantage of a person's
 
default elements is a way that dishonest people have
 
separated others from their money for years. For example, I
 
once went to look at an old Mercury Cougar that I was
 
considering buying, which was advertised as having air
 
conditioning. I relied on my default element when I
 
envisioned myself flipping on the air conditioning in the
 
Cougar and feeling the cool air coming out. That is the way
 
air conditioning works. I have used many cars with air
 
conditioning and that is the way they all worked. However,
 
when the hood of the car was raised, it was obvious that the
 
air conditioning was not yet entirely installed. If I had
 
relied upon the information provided by my default element
 
and not investigated further, I would had concluded
 
incorrectly that I was buying a car with working air
 
conditioning. It does not take a dishonest person for
 
default elements to potentially cause problems, though.
 
Anytime we fill in a bit of unstated information using a
 
default element that does not correspond with reality, we are
 
assuming something that is not true and may be in danger of
 
interpreting or concluding incorrectly. For example, based
 
on default elements, a person may assume that the restaurant
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he or she is going to will have forks and knives on the
 
table. However, that would be an incorrect assumption if the
 
restaurant served food medieval style and patrons were
 
expected to eat with their fingers and get sauce under their
 
fingernails, just like the medieval folks did.
 
However, despite the fact mental models do have some
 
potential problems, human beings refer to their models when
 
they make decision about their courses of action even if
 
their action is something as simple as deciding where to put
 
the knife they have just used to butter their toast. It is
 
impossible to interpret and make logical decisions without
 
background knowledge, and the models are the storage system
 
for that background knowledge. What is believed to be real
 
or possible or likely or unavoidable, not to mention what is
 
right or wrong, is determined by the model of the world a
 
person uses. The models impose some order on an often
 
conflicting amd confusing world and allow humans to escape an
 
overwhelming muddle of conflicting information.
 
The idea that mental models are based on a person's
 
experiences does bring up the interesting point that ^
 
everyone's background knowledge is not the same. Even in a
 
faitiily living in the s^e house, not every individual is
 
going to have the same background knowledge. Even Brown and
 
Yule say, "These models of reality are, of course,
 
representations of the way the world is. They may differ
 
from one individual to the next. This is unavoidably the
 
 case when such models are the result of a listener's (or
 
reader's) comprehension of discourse" (Brown & Yule 252).
 
You may ask: why is it that individuals' ideas of
 
ireality do not hopelessly clash> leaving all of hxamankind
 
unable to understand and communicate with one another? There
 
seem to be several reasons. Grice'sCdoperative Principle
 
explains how people observe his four maxims in order to
 
communicate in conversations with one another. If past
 
experiences/ beliefs/ and values are held in common/ then
 
understanding of communication and argument is more likely
 
than if past experiehces/ beliefs/ and values are different
 
because these things lead to similar models of the world and
 
its workings.
 
It seems single enough/ biit oftentiines it seems that
 
misconimunication is not as simple as one person saying to
 
another/ "I do not understand you." Rather/ it takos a more
 
subtle form in which the first person makes a statement/ the
 
second person interprets it differently than the first
 
intended/ and neither person realizes that the message that
 
was meant to be conveyed was not. This sort of
 
miscommuniGation points to what seans to be a larger process
 
at work that is reflected in the warrant and its backing in
 
Toulmin's model of argument because there we can see how
 
background knowledge is used in everyday logic. It is as if
 
there are "maxims" of shared understanding: past experiences/
 
beliefs/ and values that work as guides so that people can
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build similar mental models and, as a result, reason
 
similarly (Fig. 6). Just as in conversational implicature,
 
what the speaker or writer leaves unstated he or she assumes
 
(oftentimes without realizing he or she is assuming anything)
 
the listener or reader will be able to fill in to understand
 
what was implied. However, if the listener/reader does not
 
share the same experiences, beliefs, and values, he or she
 
may not understand what was implied and/or may fill in the
 
gap with different information than what the speaker/writer
 
intended and have a possibly very different interpretation of
 
what was implied. As Brown and Yule point out, "The
 
individual hearer's mental model of discourse can differ from
 
the speaker's, and there is no suggestion that the text is,
 
in any sense, the model" (Brown & Yule 234).
 
Past experiences, whether they be individual, shared, or
 
historical, are possibly the most important part of the
 
formation of mental models because they are important to the
 
formation of expectations, beliefs and values. Shared past
 
experiences, as a result, are a key to members of a group or
 
society building similar mental models and interpreting
 
language and situations in a like manner. For example,
 
people who lived through the Great Depression of the 1930's
 
often were conscious of wasting anything and did not trust
 
banks due to the number of bank failures in that time, which
 
resulted in people losing all their savings. My own great
 
grandfather was known to keep his money buried in a jar on
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 his Arkansas farm. However, in 1999, a typical 21-year-old
 
cpliege student did not experience the Great peprassibn, so
 
if soiueone who lived through the Depression said he or she
 
does not trnst banks, then the typical 2i-year-old would try
 
to understand using his or her own experiences. All
 
reputable banks are now insured by the FDIC (Federal Division
 
of Investment and Goinrnerce), and it is unlikely that the
 
student would have ever seen a bank close and the deppsitors
 
lose their life savings, so he or she would try to understand
 
why the Depression survivors distrust banks based own his or
 
her own life experiences. He or she might draw upon
 
experiences with exorbitant or hidden bank charges for using
 
automated teller machines, talking to a teller, closing an
 
account, allowing an account to dip below a minimum account
 
balance, or having cancelled checks returned, and conclude
 
that it is not a good idea to trust banks because they have
 
these hidden or expensive charges, so it seems as if they are
 
always trying to take money away from a person. The young
 
student may agree that it is not a good idea to entirely
 
tfust banks, but he or she will not fully understand the idea
 
that the Depression survivor was trying to get across. After
 
all, the Depression survivor is very likely trying to express
 
that he or she has seen banks close before and does not trust
 
banks to keep his or her life savings safe. It is this
 
"violation" of the "maxim" of shared experience that leads to
 
an implicature or gap of undefstartding, which in this case
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has not been correctly filled in because, based own their
 
past experiences, the two participants have constructed
 
different mental models. When a large segment of a
 
population shares experiences, those people have similar
 
mental models and are better able to fill in the gaps of
 
understanding with what the speaker or writer from their
 
group intended.
 
Beliefs are also instrumental to interpretation and
 
decision making, as well as the formation of values. These
 
beliefs may include organized religious beliefs and/or myths
 
(even these designations depend on your perspective) or even
 
cultural norms. Beliefs include world view, or how people
 
see themselves in relation to the physical world, deities and
 
other great powers (including money, science, and
 
technology); people of the saiite group, and people of
 
different groupsw Ah we11> there are also beliefs and myths
 
about the origin, purpose, or destiny of a group of people or
 
of hximan beings in general (sadly, these beliefs are often
 
used to rationalize one group's mistreatment of another). If
 
one is not part of a belief system, he or she is going to
 
having difficulty filling in gaps in logic that seem quite
 
obvious to people who are members of that belief system and
 
have incorporated that belief system into their mental
 
models.
 
A powerful part of the communication linked to beliefs
 
is the standardization of symbols, which is a group coming to
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agree on, and/or reinforcing, a meaning or set of meanings
 
and associations with a symbol. In the mind of an American,
 
the phrase, "As American as apple pie," creates all kinds of
 
associations: love of mothers, home, patriotism, tradition,
 
and so on. However, the phrase is apt to be very puzzling to
 
a person living in another country who hears it for the first
 
time. Also, since symbols are often presented visually, they
 
may act as context for a statement that is spoken or printed,
 
so background knowledge about the symbol must be "called up"
 
and incorporated into mental models. Of course, shared
 
experiences also help give symbols their meaning as well.
 
Finally, values influence how we interpret situations
 
and what deductions we make about them. Based on past
 
experiences and belief systems, people determine what is
 
good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse, what is
 
important, and what is less important or trivial. For
 
example, here in the United States of America, we generally
 
tend to hold the newest, latest, and most up-to-date
 
products, ideas, and systems in highest esteem, while other
 
cultures value more traditional things. For example, I have
 
students from Mexico, Vietnam, and Nigeria who have
 
complained to me that they are shocked at how the elderly are
 
treated with little respect in the United States. To them,
 
the elderly are instilled with the wisdom of age and
 
experience and play an important role in maintaining culture
 
and tradition. They value their elderly. On the other hand,
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in the United States, the elderly are routinely considered
 
outdated, archaic, not worthy of employnient, and a burden to
 
their children. It might also be taken into account that
 
Americans' love of individuality may supersede feelings of
 
responsibility and duty to family. Values are somewhat like
 
the yardsticks or scales built into mental models which allow
 
us to measure and weigh our options against each other.
 
As we can see, if we use Grice's model of implicature as
 
an analogy, the past experiences, beliefs, and values that
 
statements, in conversation and in argument, often leave
 
unstated act as ittaxims, and an implicature is created by
 
violating the three maxims of understanding. In other words,
 
those people who do not share the same past experiences,
 
beliefs, and values are very likely to interpret things
 
differently from people with more similar backgrounds.
 
The building of like models in groups or societies boils
 
down to a combination of shared experiences and social
 
reinforcements. Of course, there will be variations from
 
culture to culture, and subcultures and subsets of cultures
 
will vary as well. However, those people who are deemed to
 
be too far from the beliefs and models of the vast majority
 
will find themselves castigated and discredited by the other
 
members of their society. They are labeled as abnormal and
 
their sanity is called into question.
 
These models color people's interpretation of meaning
 
because humans' past experiences and beliefs affect how
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people interpret what they see and hear. People refer back
 
to their models of the wotld in order to understand any new
 
information they are given. They check out what they have
 
been told (consciously of unconsciously) by asking a series
 
of questions of themselves, and the answers ara drawn from
 
their mental model. Is What X have been told possible? Is
 
what I have been told likely? How does the pfesenter of this
 
message influence my response to this message? Do I agree
 
with; the premises? Do I agree with the conclusion? How
 
should I respond? What action do I need to take? Whatever
 
model of the World a person has constructed will be used to
 
answer these questions, and that is what accounts for
 
different interpretations of texts or situations.
 
For example, if you were approached in the supermarket
 
parking lot by a scruffy-looking, middle-aged, black man who
 
told you his car died, and he then asked if you could spare
 
$20 towards his Greyhound Bus ticket^ would you believe his
 
story and give him $20? If so, why would you? If not, why
 
would you not? The answers to these questions are dependent
 
on the mental model of the world you hav^e constructed. In
 
this situation, O^ E^fson liLgM return to the store, report
 
the incident, and ask for an escort; another person might
 
just walk past the man silently; a third person might give
 
the man some cash; a fourth person might concoct and give
 
some excuse for denying the man's request; and a fifth person
 
might become angry at the man and say something cutting to
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him. The responses all depend on interpretation, and given
 
the same reality, people will make different choices because
 
they look not to reality but to their models of reality to
 
interpret the situation and decide on a course of action.
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The Leap is of the Same Nature
 
Grice's Implicature Toulmin's Warrants
 
Listener: Is Hike home?
 
Speaker: His car is parked
 
in the driveway.
 
The listener assiuiies that the
 
speaker is following the
 
Cooperative Principle
 
However, it seems the Maxim of
 
Relevance is flouted; this is
 
the source of the gap.
 
The listener must use
 
background knowledge of the
 
world to find the connectibh:
 
• Cars are for travel
 
• If Mike'3 car is home, Mike;
 
is probably not traveling,
 
but at home.
 
Once the connection is made,
 
the listener understands what
 
the speaker meant.
 
Speaker: When there is
 
smoke, there is fire.
 
The listener assumes that
 
the speaker is following the
 
Cooperative Principle.
 
However, since this is an
 
argument, the listener may
 
question if the Maxim of
 
Quality is being flouted;
 
this is the source of the
 
.................................
 
The listener must use
 
background knowledge of the
 
world to fill in, and
 
evaluate, the connection:
 
• Fire burns
 
• when something burns,
 
smoke is produced
 
• Smoke does, therefore,
 
indicate fire
 
Once the connection is made,
 
the listener understands
 
what the speaker meant and
 
can evaluate the logic of
 
the argument.
 
Figure 5^ The leap is of the same nature.
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Possible Parallelism Between
 
Grice's In^licature and Toulmin's Warrants
 
Gxxc&'s Inpllcature
 
Cooperative Principle
 
Four Maxims speakers/writers
 
must obey to be understood
 
when using in^licature:
 
1. Quantity
 
•	Say enough
 
2. Quality
 
• Say whah is truthful or
 
reasonably substantiated
 
3. Relations
 
• Say something that
 
relates to the
 
conversation at hand
 
4. Manner
 
• Say what is to be said in
 
a way that can be
 
understood
 
Toulmin's Warrant
 
Cooperative Principle
 
Three Maxims of understanding
 
unstated warrants and becking:
 
1. 	Past Experiences
 
• Shered. Individual,
 
historical (importance to
 
the formation of belief
 
and values)
 
1. Beliefs
 
World view
 
'Origin, purpose, destiny
 
•	Standardization of symbols
 
2. 	Values
 
•	What is good, bad, better.
 
worse
 
•	What is important or
 
trivial
 
Any gaps in understanding are filled in with
 
Context and Badkgxoxmd Knowledge
 
This knowledge is drawn from
 
the Mental Model of the world
 
a listener/reader has.
 
Figure 6. How Toulxnin's warrant is parallel to Grice's
 
implicature.
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Chapter Four: Conclusions and Implications
 
Words like violence
 
Break the silence
 
Come crashing in
 
Into my little world
 
Painful to me
 
Pierce right through me
 
Can't you understand
 
Oh my little girl
 
"Enjoy the Silence," Depeche Mode
 
As it is presently described, the theory of
 
mental models actually predicts massively
 
detailed mental representations of any event
 
encountered, whether in life or via text.
 
(BiTown & Yule 255)
 
The idea of orgahizing the background knowledge
 
necessary to fill in gaps in coitimunication, logic, and
 
meaning by using mental models leads to many questions
 
involving varying fields and a few possible suggestions for
 
communication. After examining implicature, warrants, and
 
mental models, it is obvious that there is no perfect
 
language or absolute meaning invested in language itself
 
which will keep human beings from misunderstandihg each other
 
because meaning is not located in words> Meaning comes from
 
the organized and interpreted backgrdunci knowled^ that
 
people carry with them in their minds, so attempts to
 
understand language and the mental processes are not in
 
themselves enough to prevent misunderstandings or to create
 
perfect understanding between individuals or groups. As
 
Brown and Yule point out, even everyday instances of
 
interpreting meaning Can be quite complicated:
 
However, it is typically the case that the texts
 
which the reader will normally encounter will show
 
a minimal amount of formal cohesion, assume massive
 
amounts of existing background knowledge, and
 
normally require the reader to make whatever
 
inferences he feels willing to work for in order to
 
reach an understanding of what is being conveyed.
 
(Brown & Yule 270)
 
Also, since the reality we, as individuals, inhabit is not
 
going to be identical to the reality that our neighbors
 
inhabit, there are clashes in logic and arguments,
 
misunderstandings, disputes, and sometimes even physical
 
violence between individuals and groups.
 
This brings up the somewhat philosophical question of
 
whose reality is better/best. Is the best reality the one
 
which corresponds most closely to the world or one that is
 
blissfully optimistic? Is it people with the most experience
 
or knowledge who have the best grip on reality? Or could it
 
be people who show a particular skill such as mechanics or
 
writing who have a better grasp on reality? Does it vary
 
from situation to situation? Johnson-Laird, author of Mental
 
Models. suggests that the best reality is the one that
 
corresponds most closely to the real world: "A contingent
 
assertion is true if it corresponds to reality; false if it
 
conflicts with reality" (Johnson-Laird 438). Obviously, it
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 could be quite dangerous if someone believed he or she could
 
j\imp off a four-story building and land unharmed. However^
 
it might be equally dangerous to be the person who know that
 
the Earth revolves around the sun when the Church and the
 
rest of the society "know" that the sun revolves around the
 
Earth.
 
Along that line of thought, some might wonder if the
 
ideas about mental ianodels put forth in this thesis support
 
Foucault'S ideas of "dpistei^ or ''discourse foirmulation" and
 
"marginalizatioh" (Eoss, Foss, Tra|^ 209-239). To some
 
extent they seem to, since it seems likely that the group in
 
power in a society will be able to marginalize people whose
 
realities clash with their own. Remember that people thought
 
Christopher Columbus was "mad" when he wahted to sail around
 
a world that people oncei believed was flat, and the
 
Victorians "knew" tomatoes were poisonous. What we believe
 
today could be perceived as ludicrous tomorrow. Our ideas of
 
common sense, intelligence, and/or sanity may be greatly
 
influenced by the democratization of knowledge and social
 
reinforcement of mental models.
 
Also, what about some forms of mental illness which are
 
not merely one person's ideas clashing with society's ideas?
 
Perhaps people with more serious mental illnesses, whose best
 
hope of treatment is currently medication, are affected in a
 
physical way that does not allow them to build models.
 
Consequently, this does not allow th«n to function
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succesisfully in the real, physical world, because their
 
models do not correspond closely enough to the physical world
 
and/or social expectations.
 
Minor problelos of illogical thinking, also known as
 
"cognitive distortions" (which we all tend to fall into at
 
some point or another and which can often times be resolved
 
on their own or with brief cpunseling), may just be the
 
result of minor misrepresentations in a person's mental model
 
(Ubell 584). People make distorted judgements because "all
 
too often our logic is muddied by our fears, expectations,
 
and desires^. [F]or example...[wie experience rejectibn and
 
conclude that we are failures" (Langan 584), TO break a
 
cycle of distorted thinking and promote "clear thinking...
 
Confront your belief with reality, that is with real
 
evidence" (Ubell 587). Once people accept that reality is
 
different from the models they had previously iaeen using,
 
they change their models to more closely correspond to
 
reality. At times, this can be accomplished qhiet simply;
 
for example, "[tjherapists often ask their clients to make
 
lists of good or bad things about themselves. This exercise
 
shows patients that reality is different from their negative
 
ideas (.Ubell ■ •588).. 
These modifications of mental models, with the
 
assistance of a therapist, bring up the necessary question of
 
unscrupulous people who would like to change others' mental
 
models in order to gain something themselves. In other
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words, what effect does propaganda have on mentai models? It
 
may not be true that a, certain brand of jeans will make
 
someone "cool/" but in advertising, we see that idea modeled
 
repeatedly, in the hopes that we will accept it as reality
 
and incorporate it as background knowledge into our mental
 
models. Wheh a politician lies to us, he Or she wants us to
 
accept his or her words as reality. Our society teaches us
 
to be aware of these types of propaganda and accept them as
 
relatively harmless, perhaps in part because we do not want
 
to admit the impect they can have on us. However, the
 
dishonest way that inental models can be influenced and
 
modified can even be more insidious and damaging because it
 
amounts to nothing less than brainwashing: that is, an
 
instance where a person is systematically worn down until he
 
or she replaces the background knowledge which composes his
 
or her mental models of reality with the background knowledge
 
he or she is given. Anthony PratkinS and Elliot Arson,
 
authors of Ace of Propaganda say that "[t]he first step to
 
staring a cult is to construct your own social reality by
 
eliminating all sources of information other than that
 
provided by the cult" (Pratkanis, Arpnson 241), and then, as
 
the second step, "in constructing...(thisj social reality is
 
to provide a cult's-eye view of the world. This picture of
 
the world is then used by members to interpret all events and
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happenings" (Pratkanis, Aronson 242). They also say that
 
cults are not alone in the use of these tactics:
 
But there is another reason for understanding the
 
persuasion tactics of cults. Cults use the same
 
persuasion tactics often used by other
 
propagandists; cults just use them in a more
 
thorough and complete manner. It may be useful to
 
reread this discussion and instead of thinking of
 
cults, consider your everyday social groups such as
 
family, church, country, or place of work. We bet
 
you'll find a touch of cult-like behavior in much
 
of our social lives. (Pratkanis, Aronson 248-249)
 
These are just some of the various questions brought up
 
by this look at implicature, warrants, or mental models.
 
Unfortunately, for some of these questions I have less-than­
definite answers, and so I defer to philosophers,
 
psychologists, and psychiatrists.
 
For this thesis, communication, and more specifically
 
understanding miscommunication in the hopes of avoiding
 
miscommunication, is the focus. I do not mean, by putting
 
forth the idea that decision making is based on individual
 
world models, to advocate the idea that we should revert into
 
a state of indiscriminate relativism, where there is no
 
right, wrong, better, or worse and reality is "up for grabs."
 
I only hope that putting forth the idea of interpretations
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and decision-making based on mental models will better help
 
in the understanding of communication.
 
At the very least, the idea of mental models should
 
reinforce the ideas that we teach our English composition
 
students: that they should not assume their audiences share
 
the same knowledge or experience they do; that they should
 
not simply throw out facts and conclusions and assume that
 
the audience will be able to replicate and agree with their
 
logic; that additional explanation and details increase a
 
reader's ability to understand the meaning that a writer is
 
trying to communicate; and that well-explained examples and
 
illustrations can make somewhat abstract ideas they are
 
trying to explain more concrete and their intended meanings
 
more clear. However, this lesson is not just for composition
 
students or their instructors. These basic tenets of clear
 
communication hold true for all writers and speakers if they
 
wish to communicate clearly and effectively.
 
In addition, the idea of mental models helps explain why
 
communication goes awry between both individuals and groups.
 
The problem is not in the words themselves, but in how the
 
words are interpreted in the context of mental models. A
 
large group such as a society encourages and enforces certain
 
mental models for the individuals contained in that group.
 
Not surprisingly, individuals from different societies will
 
have clashing models of the world. What seems to be
 
obviously the correct course of action to a person of one
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group may seem to be sheer lunacy to a person from the other
 
group. Also, take into account that stereotypical
 
representations of people of various groups are going to
 
inhabit these mental models. These stereotypes are not
 
limited to major issues such as socio-economics, race,
 
nationality, or religion. They could involve people who wear
 
plaid. However, major issues tend to cause rather large
 
political and military clashes, whereas wearing plaid,
 
generally, will not.
 
Stereotypes, division, and classification analogies are
 
all vital ways people use to make sense of new situations
 
quickly, and, I would suggest, this also allows them to find
 
the corresponding information in their mental models that
 
guide their response. Of course, stereotyping itself can
 
lead to communication problems, particularly when the
 
stereotype contributes to feelings of mistrust between people
 
or groups that destroy or undermine the credibility of the
 
communicator. As Brown and Yule point out, "A large part of
 
our comprehension of what we read and hear (and see, no
 
doubt) is, after all, a product of our making sense of the
 
motivations, goals, plans and reasons of participants in
 
described or witnessed events" (Brown & Yule 268).
 
Therefore, if one group or individual uses a false stereotype
 
of another group or individual, it is likely that the
 
interpretation of what is said or done will be incorrect.
 
For example, if an elderly gentlaaian believes that all long^
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haired, teenage boys are trouble-makers, then, even if the
 
long-hair teenage boy next door offer to help him carry
 
something into his house, it is likely that rather than
 
seeing this as a sincere gesture, the older man may think the
 
teenager is just looking for an opportunity to steal from
 
him. The same sort of distrust can arise between two
 
countries (for example, the United States and the Soviet
 
Union during the Gold War) or two groups vying for control of
 
the same space (such as the Israelis and the Palestinians).
 
These two larger, intercultural problems point out the
 
importance of not only communicating clearly, but also
 
looking for where meaning may be lost or distorted or
 
disputed because of differing perspectives. This may occur
 
on a large scale between two countries or on a small scale
 
between two individuals or two small groups within a culture.
 
Miscommunication due to clashing mental models can be
 
the most frustrating form of miscommunication, because it is
 
not the expressibh or the language of what is communicated
 
that is the prpblem; rather, it is the ideology behind what
 
is communicated that is the problem. In a way, it is similar
 
to the difference between a person receiving directions over
 
the phone and having difficulty finding a place on a road map
 
versus a person receiving directions over the phone but
 
having a different road map than the person giving the
 
directions. These sorts of communication problems can only
 
be overcome by the participants acknowledging that these
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problems may come up, consciously working to find the
 
underlying beliefs that clash, and working to come to some
 
sort of mutual agreement about these clashes. In short,
 
communication involves a dialogue in which participants learn
 
more about the workings of each other's mental models.
 
Without these mental models, communication is ineffective and
 
can cause severe problems. If a clash is too great,
 
communication dies; in its place arise name-calling,
 
disparaging comments, exclusion, vandalism, physical
 
violence, and/or war.
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